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
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310



DAAG-PAP-A (M) (17 Jan 72) DAFD-OTT 711008 711007 3 February 1972

SUBJECT: ~~Operational Report~~ Lessons Learned, ~~1st Battalion,~~
~~92d Artillery; 5th Battalion, 16 Artillery~~
~~1971-1972~~

19345

SEE DISTRIBUTION

(18) DAFD, DAFD

(19) OTT-71 1007,
OTT-71 1008

(18) 2
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AD

1. Section 2 of reports, subject as above, are forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with para 4b, AR 525-15.

2. The information contained in these reports is provided to insure that lessons learned during current operations are used to the benefit of future operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.


Operational info. for period e.g., 30 Sep 71.
3. Information of actions initiated as a result of your evaluation should be forwarded to the Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, ATTN: DAFD-OTT, within 90 days of receipt of this letter.

4. As Section 1 of subject reports are not pertinent to the Lessons Learned program, they have been omitted.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

Verne L. Bowers

VERNE L. BOWERS
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General



FILE COPY

- 2 Incl.
1. DAFD-OTT 711007
2. DAFD-OTT 711008

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3
AVG-G-FAR-OP

30 April 1971

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 5th Battalion 16th Artillery For Period Ending 30 April 1971. RCS: CSFOR-65 (R-3).

SECTION II LESSONS LEARNED

1. (U) Defense of Medium and Heavy Artillery Bases:

In medium and heavy artillery batteries where Flechette Anti-Personnel Rounds (Dec-Hive) are not available, it has been found that firing HE with a minimum burst time setting (Killer Junior) had the best effect - both physical and psychological - for Defensive Fires. To insure their effectiveness, instruction should be given to each howitzer section on targets located at different ranges, also, on shooting not only on level ground but on slopes. Placing a range card showing quadrants and fuze settings, in each section will also enhance the results.

2. (U) Artillery Movement Along Unsecure Roads.

In moving self propelled batteries along unsecured roads, it was found that main losses came not from active enemy activities but from mines. Not only must the road be swept prior to movement, but also a careful watch must be kept for freshly emplaced mines during movement. A method that helped in this respect was to use a helicopter at low level, to blow dust off of the road, revealing fresh mine emplacements. Because of mines, it was not practical even with armored cavalry providing security, to resupply remote firebases by convoy. Enough supplies can be carried in on the initial insertion to allow resupply by CH-47, on an as needed basis. This would release units, that would normally be used for resupply convoys, for other missions.

3. (U) Change in Mission for a Medium Artillery Battery.

The mission of medium artillery batteries in the Republic of Vietnam (with some exceptions in the Mech Units) is General Reinforcing or General Support. When used in the direct support role instead of the normal direct support artillery, additional burdens are placed on all concerned. The Medium Artillery's TO&E does not provide for LNO's or FO's for this type of mission. If the FO's from the normal DS battery are used they are often reluctant to call in close fires when needed, as they are unfamiliar with the effects, and many times use more rounds than would normally be used to accomplish the mission. The forward observer needed, in most cases, additional training in the use of medium artillery and the effects that they achieved. The use of medium artillery in the DS role, in support of Infantry, does not provide the most effective utilization of the artillery's firepower. The normal reinforcing mission is more appropriate and should be adhered to, if at all possible, when light artillery is available.

4. (U) Disposition of LNO's and FO's During Stand Down

When a field artillery unit is standing down, the continued effective utilization of LNO's and FO's to supported units becomes a problem. Should another artillery unit be designated to take over the mission, the LNO's and FO's should be reassigned to the new artillery unit. In doing this, there will be minimum of confusion and operational time lost. It was found that an LNO or an FO could be cleared, reassigned and back on the job in 48 hours. The remaining LNO's and FO's were able to provide support during this period so there was minimum operational loss.

DAFD-OTT
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Incl 1

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AVCG-FAB-OP

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30 April 1971

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 5th Battalion 16th Artillery For Period Ending
30 April 71. RCS: CSFO.-65 (R-3).

5. Emplacement of Sensor Devices in Heavy Jungle:

When sensor devices (duffel bag) were first emplaced in the Central Highlands as an early warning system, they were dropped from an aircraft (helicopter) and their location was then plotted on a map from the air. When it then became desirable for the Duffel Bag strings to be more accurately located, they were dropped from an aircraft; but this time a MPQ-4 Radar employing a double beam scan was used to give grid coordinates that would be effective up to 50 meters. Both methods proved ineffective however; for the first relied principally on the viewers ability to read a map, and the second because the radar picked up only 62% of the sensors that were dropped. Therefore, it was determined that in order for the Duffel Bag program to be effective each position would have to be surveyed. Because of the extensive amount of time and the sizeable security force that was needed to emplace the system using a traverse method, an alternative method had to be used that would ensure an acceptable accuracy, and reduce the time required and security element needed for a traverse.

Hence, it was determined that a triangulation method would be used; first the proposed sensor locations were plotted on a map; second the survey team went out and taped six (6) bases long enough so that the end points would ensure an acceptable apex angle; third, the Duffel Bag accompanied the three (3) APC's maneuvered through the jungle to start laying out their strings. On reaching a point where a sensor was to be emplaced, the placing personnel would notify the survey team by radio, then the T-16 theodolites, that were set up at each end of the appropriate base, would move to the general area. A pinflare was then fired through the jungle so that the theodolite could better locate the sensor. Then a hand flare was fired. After recording that reading, a second hand flare was fired another reading was taken. The two readings were then meandered. The team in the field would then move on to the next location and the procedure was repeated, until all strings were emplaced. Total time to emplace sensors using this method was eleven (11) days in which twenty-four (24) strings, five (5) sensors per string, were emplaced.

Lowell G. Smith
LOWELL G. SMITH
LTC, FA
Commanding

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5

AVOC-FAB-OP (30 Apr 71) 1st Ind (U)

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned of 5th Battalion, 16th
Field Artillery for Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS;
CSFOR-65 (R-3)

DA, Hq, 52nd Artillery Group, APO 96318, 8 May 71

THRU: Commanding Officer, SRAC Artillery, APO 96350

TO: ACSFOR, DA, Washington, DC, 20310

Subject reports have been reviewed and are approved.

James M. Wroth
JAMES M. WROTH
COL, FA
Commanding

³
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AVFA-AT-D (30 April 1971) 2d Ind (U)


SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, headquarters 5th Battalion,
16th Artillery for Period Ending 30 April 1971, ACB CSFOM-65 (A-3) (U)

DA, Headquarters, Second Regional Assistance Command Artillery, ATTN: AVFA-AT-D,
APO 96350. 14 MAY 1971

TO: Commanding General, Second Regional Assistance Command, APO 96350

This headquarters has evaluated subject ORLL and forwarding indorsement and concurs.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



BILLY M. WALKER
Lieutenant Colonel, FA
Adjutant



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Headquarters United States Army Forces, Military Region 2
APO San Francisco, 96350

AVFA-GC 3rd Ind

21 JUN 1971

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned of 5th Battalion, 16 Field Artillery for Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSPOR-65 (R3)(U)

Commanding Officer
United States Army Vietnam
ATTN: AVHDO-DO
APO 96375

This headquarters, has reviewed the attached report, considers it adequate and concurs with the contents.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

SIDNEY CORNETT
Maj. AGC
Assistant AG

7A. AVHDO-DO (30 Apr 71) 4th Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 5th Battalion, 16th Artillery For Period
Ending 30 April 1971. RCS: CSFOR-65 (R3)

Headquarters, United States Army Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96375 29 SEP 1971

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-FD,
APO 96558

This Headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report Lessons Learned
for the period ending 30 April 1971 from Headquarters, 5th Battalion,
16th Artillery and concur with comments of indorsing headquarters.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Cy fum:
5/16th Arty
SRAC

Lawrence E. Park Jr. 1LT
J.C. HONSOWETZ
CPT. AGC.
Assistant Adjutant General

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CGOP-FD (30 Apr 71) 3th Inf (U)

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, HQ 16th
Artillery, Period Ending 30 April 1971,
RCS CAFOR-65 (R3) (U)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 1 NOV 1971

TO: HQDA (DAFD-ZA), WASH DC 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

L. M. OZAKI
CPT, AGO
Asst AG

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AVGG-FAL-OP

5 May 1971

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned of 1st Battalion, 92d Artillery
for the Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS: CSFOR-65 (R-3) (U)

2. (C) Lessons Learned:

- a. Personnel: None
- b. Intelligence: None
- c. Operations:

(1) Gunship Employment

(a) Observation: Gunships were effectively employed at the beginning of the battle by the 1-92d LNO. Once the situation became critical, personnel from various other agencies attempted to control the aircraft, leading to more confusion. (See after action report on battle of Phu Nhon, attached)

DAFD-OTT
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AVG-FAA-OP

5 May 1971

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned of 1st Battalion, 92d Artillery
for the Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS: CSFO -65 (R-3) (U)

(b) Evaluation: Gunships were not used to their fullest due to the lack of control and coordination. This likewise hindered the employment of artillery.

(c) Recommendations: That an overall fire support coordinator be appointed by the highest headquarters involved in the operation. His team should include both U.S. and Vietnamese artillery, Army aviation and Air Force personnel.

(d) Command Action: Discussions were held with representatives of Pleiku Sector, II Corps, and the 20th Engineer Battalion to effect coordination, but to little avail.

(2) U.S. Artillery:

(a) Observation: The Vietnamese personnel initially were reluctant to use U.S. artillery fire support.

(b) Evaluation: The tactical situation grew critical when perhaps contact could have been broken by the use of artillery fires.

(c) Recommendations: That Vietnamese personnel be made aware of the support available to them and the effectiveness it can produce prior to the initiation of such actions.

(d) Command Action: Liaison officers and forward observers from this unit were kept with Vietnamese units, and were eventually able to show what we could do for them.

(3) Perimeter Security:

(a) Observation: Our defense of Phu Nhon was successful primarily because of adherence to the basics of position defense, specifically having alert guards and deep, simple fox holes, which allowed good grazing fire.

(b) Evaluation: More effort should be spent in keeping guard personnel alert and motivated than in constructing elaborate, extensive defensive barriers around positions.

(c) Recommendation: Methods of keeping guards alert be stressed in perimeter defense classes.

(d) Command Action: This battalion has in effect the following procedures to assist in developing and maintaining guard alertness:

- (1) Guards are briefed on the current enemy situation at guardmount.
- (2) Soup and Coffee are delivered to guards throughout the night.

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B

AVGG-FAA-OP

5 May 1971

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned of 1st Battalion, 92d Artillery
for the Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS: CSFOR-65 (R-3) (U)

- (3) The OD checks each perimeter position hourly.
- (4) Commo checks are made with each perimeter position hourly.

d. Organization: None

e. Training: None

f. Logistics: None

g. Communications:

(1) Equipment status:

(a) Observation: When the battalion is spread out as far as we have been in our support mission, communications with the more distant firing positions is virtually impossible.

(b) Evaluation: More communications equipment is needed to allow us to perform our jobs at optimum effectiveness in such an extended configuration. Current TOEs are unrealistic considering the situation.

(c) Recommendations: That Corps- or Army-wide facility be established from which units may draw required non-TOE or above TOE communications equipment. This facility should be under the direct control of the Corps (Field Force) Operations section. When missions are assigned, the equipment needed to perform them can be provided.

(d) Command Action: The battalion borrowed additional equipment from our support agencies and neighboring units to meet out requirements, pending submission of a request to change the TOE.


h. Material: None

i. Other: None

2 Incl

1. List of locations

2. After Action Report of battle at Phu Nhon



JOHN S. CHESBRO

LTC, FA

Commanding

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AVOC-FAA-OP (5 May 71) 1st Ind (U)

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned of 1st Battalion, 92nd
Field Artillery for Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS:
CSPFOR-65 (R-3)

DA, Hq, 52nd Artillery Group, APO 96318, 8 May 71

THRU: Commanding Officer, SRAC Artillery, APO 96350

TO: ACSFOR, DA, Washington, DC, 20310

Subject reports have been reviewed and are approved.

James M. Roth
JAMES M. ROTH
COL, FA
Commanding

4

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AVFA-AI-D (5 May 71) 2d Ind (U)

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 1st Battalion, 92d Field Artillery for Period Ending 30 April 1971 RCS CFSOM-65 (R-3) (U)

DA, Headquarters, Second Regional Assistance Command Artillery, ATTN:

AVFA-AI-D, APO 96390

14 MAY 1971

TO: Commanding General, Second Regional Assistance Command, APO 96390

This headquarters has evaluated subject O&L and forwarding endorsement and concurs.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

SIGNED
BILLY M WALKER
Lieutenant Colonel, FA
Adjutant



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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Headquarters United States Army Forces, Military Region 2
APO San Francisco, 96350

AVFA-GC 3rd Ind

17 JUN 1971

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 1st Battalion, 92d Field Artillery for Period Ending 30 April 1971 RCS CSFOR-65 (R-3) (U)

Commanding Officer
United States Army Vietnam
ATTN: AVHDO-ID
APO 96375

This headquarters, has reviewed the attached report, considers it adequate and concurs with the contents.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "L. D. Pence".

L. D. PENCE
LTC, AGC
Adjutant General

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AVHDO-DO (5 May 71) 4th Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 1st Battalion, 92d Field
Artillery for Period Ending 30 April 1971 RCS CSFOR-65 (R-3)(U)

Headquarters, United States Army Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96375 29 SEP 1971

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-FD,
APO 96558

This Headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned
for the period ending 30 April 1971 from Headquarters, 1st Battalion,
92d Field Artillery and concur with comments of indorsing headquarters.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

James E. Etchells Jr. 1LT
J.E. HONSOWETZ
CPT. AGC.
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy furn:
1/92d Arty
SRAC

20
GPOP-FD (5 May 71) 5th Ind (U)

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, HQ 92d Field
Artillery, Period Ending 30 April 1971,
RCS CSFOR-65 (R3) (U)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 1 NOV 1971

TO: HQDA (DAFD-ZA), WASH DC 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:



L.M. OZAKI
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

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AVGG-FIA-OP

5 May 1971

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned of 1st Battalion, 92d Artillery
for the Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS: CSFOR-65 (R-3) (U)

The coordinates of locations occupied by the 1st Batt. 92d Artillery are listed below.

<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>COORDINATES</u>
Artillery Hill	ZA 228536
FSB Sarah II	ZA 111677
LZ Weigt Davis	AR 896113
FSE 6	YB 935159
FSB 12	YB 869256
FSB Kelly	ZA 228535
FSB Athena	AR 775904
LZ Blackhawk	BR 035536
LZ Miller	AQ 870988
Polei Krong	ZA 110911
LZ Lonely	AQ 852871
LZ Action	BR 262470
RSB Schueller	BR 367468
RSB Buffalo	BR 479434
FSE Crystal	BR 899662
FSB Dragon	ZA 229537
FSB Pony	BR 806832
FSB John Henry	BR 676708
Camp Fidel	BR 298405
FSB Mrs	ER 897550

Inclosure 1

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 1ST BATTALION, 92D ARTILLERY
APO San Francisco 96318

AVCG-FAA-OP

29 April 1971

SUBJECT: After Action Report-Phu Nhon Relief Operation

1. (C) General Summary: This report covers U. S. Artillery operations in support of the defense of Phu Nhon during the period 152355 March 1971 to 212400 March 1971. The following is the disposition of artillery during this period:

FSB Weigt Davis (AR 897117)

2 x 155mm, 1st Plt, Btry C/1-92 FA
1 x 8 inch and 1 x 175mm, Btry B/7-15 FA
2 x 40mm, Btry B/4-60 Arty

FSB T. C. Miller (AQ 870998)

2 x 155mm, 2d Plt, Btry C/1-92 FA
2 x 40mm, Btry B/4-60 Arty
2 x 105mm (ARVN), 214th Sector Platoon

LZ Lonely (AQ 852871)

2 x 155mm, 3d Plt, Btry C/1-92 FA
2 x 40mm, Btry B/4-60 Arty

FSB St. George (AR 847148)

2 x 105mm (ARVN), 223d Arty
4 x 155mm (ARVN), 223d Arty

AQ 862905

6 x 105mm (ARVN), Btry C/232d Arty

2. Intelligence:

a. During the past six months GVN pacification areas have been a principal target of VC/NVA attacks. Since early February the Phu Nhon District area has been identified as the focal point for the attacks in Pleiku Province. Based upon normal enemy areas of operation, captured documents and agent reports, the K394th Composite Battalion and the K1 Battalion of the 95B Regiment, both regular NVA units, were identified as units active in this area as early as 1 February 1971. Activity during the period of 1 February through 15 March

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Inclosure 2

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AVOC-FAA-OP

29 April 1971

SUBJECT: After Action Report-Phu Nhon Relief Operation

consisted primarily of company-size ground attacks, harassment, stand off attacks and interdiction of QL-14 by minings and ambushes. Although agent reports concerning the Phu Nhon area were not numerous there were several of possible significance which were received prior to the attack of 15-16 March. These reports identified the location of a battalion-size unit approximately 15 kilometers South of Phu Nhon on 13 March and the arrival of an artillery company approximately 10 kilometers Southeast of Phu Nhon on 14 March. These reports were forwarded to the Pleiku Province S-2. It should be noted that intelligence reports of battalion-sized elements are not unusual in the Phu Nhon area and it is not surprising that the reports received prior to 15 March failed to warn sufficiently of the impending attack of a regimental-sized element.

b. The well coordinated attack of 15-16 March was made by a regimental-sized unit under the command of the HQ 95B Regiment. In addition to the K394th and the K1 Bn/95B, the K20 Sapper Battalion and elements of the 408th Sapper Battalion are also believed to have participated. A detainee picked up on 4 April at AQ 821834, approximately 15 kilometers North of Phu Nhon, was reported as being a member of C-1 Co/K32 Bn/408th Artillery Regiment as a participating unit in the battle. With the exception of the document captured on 18 March locating the command post of the 95B Regiment at AQ 821955, approximately 4 kilometers West of Phu Nhon, no further information was currently available concerning specific enemy disposition prior to the battle. The enemy was determined and well prepared. Intelligence analysts estimate that at least one month's preparation went into the planning of this attack. The enemy's heavy volume of fire and his ability to hold his positions for as long as he did indicate that he was very well supplied and had effective medical support.

3. Situation:

a. On the evening of 15 March at 2355 hours, a North Vietnamese force of estimated regimental size initiated a sustained attack against Phu Nhon District HQ (AR 868992), attached Regional Forces, colocated U. S. artillery forces of 2d platoon, Battery C, 1st Battalion, 92d Artillery, and supporting Duster sections from Battery B, 4th Battalion, 60th Artillery. During the course of the initial evening attack the North Vietnamese forces, elements of 95B Regt, attempted to overrun the friendly forces utilising sapper attacks, assaults by fire with 82mm mortars, 120mm mortars, B-40 rockets and ground assaults. The initial attack came from the South against the U. S. artillery sector of the perimeter held by the Dusters from 4-60 Arty and the men from 1-92 FA. The enemy was unable to penetrate this area due to the heavy volume of fire and the aggressiveness of the U. S. soldiers in defense of the artillery sector. The attack then moved to the eastern perimeter in the vicinity of the ARVN artillery and ARVN guard bunkers. The enemy penetrated the wire inflicting damage to facilities and causing casualties among the South Vietnamese defenders. (See Inclosure 1, diagram of the compound). The U. S. liaison officer from 1-92 FA directed all gunships and other air-

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AVGG-FAA-OP

29 April 1971

SUBJECT: After Action Report-Phu Nhon Relief Operation

craft during the first night and morning of the attack. At times very little artillery was fired because of the danger of hitting aircraft in the area. The training and ability of the U. S. artillery and Duster personnel was shown by the fact that they had killed 21 sappers within 10 meters of the wire surrounding their compound. These sappers were heavily armed with satchel charges, B-40 rockets, Bangalore torpedoes and M-16 rifles but not one enemy gained access to their compound, and thereby were unable to inflict any major damage or wound any artillery personnel. One Duster crewman was seriously wounded by a .50 Cal round after 16 hours of fighting. Confidence in their leadership and training and a great deal of individual initiative were displayed by the artillerymen throughout the 5 day campaign. Despite lack of sleep the platoon was able to perform their missions of firing and securing their own position in an outstanding manner.

b. The ground attack which was directed against the eastern and north-eastern sides of the perimeter ran into very little resistance from the ARVN's. The men on the perimeter were never reinforced as those on guard duty remained inside their bunkers with their families. No reaction force was formed until daylight. When the MACV compound was overrun, the ARVN soldiers brought their families to the American bunkers. The ARVN artillery fired no more than 40 rounds and did not fire direct fire. Sappers were running freely through their compound with little or no resistance enabling them to occupy several key bunkers and one building while holding dependents as hostages. Finally at 161400 March CS gas grenades were employed to clear the enemy from the bunkers.

c. The enemy was able to cut off road routes North and South of Phu Nhon surrounding the defending forces and isolating them from other friendly forces and cutting off all normal land resupply during the period 16-20 March. There were pockets of enemy resistance on QL-14 South from My Thach Village (AR 835178) to Phu Nhon District HQ (AR 868992). Villages held by the enemy were located at the following areas: AR 865027, Plei Tao-AR 863045, Phu Quang-AR 870050, and Phu Nhon-AR 862997. The 2d Battalion 47th Regiment was tasked to move South and clear QL-14. At 161345 March 3rd Company/2-47 Regiment encountered a small enemy force at AR 855125 and exchanged small arms fire. The enemy force was estimated to be a platoon-sized element, but it managed to pin down 3rd Company effectively. Gunships were requested and contact was broken. The unit continued South and on 18 March the 1st and 3rd Companies of 2-47th ran into heavy resistance from the village North of Phu Nhon. A U. S. convoy escort, attempting to resupply our units, arrived on the scene and the commander offered the assistance of his four (4) Dusters and one (1) APC in dislodging the enemy. The Dusters and the APC moved on the road and provided fire support while the two ARVN companies launched another attack. The assault to the objective was made on line, but the tracked vehicles moved forward faster than the ground troops. When the objective was reached 2 Dusters were 100 meters in front of the ground forces. The Dusters were under heavy fire and one was immobilized. The remaining forces moved through the village to the South and after consolid-

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ating their position moved back around the village to the East and returned north to their former location. The Dusters had leveled the village where the enemy resistance was heavy. Later the immobilized Duster was recovered.

Vehicle resupply was found to be impossible due to heavy enemy resistance along QL-19, so aerial resupply was utilized. Throughout this period the besieged allies were subjected to daily attack by enemy 82mm mortars, 120mm mortars, B-40 rockets and small arms while U. S. helicopters and aircraft, attempting to provide aerial resupply and aviation support, were forced to undergo devastating ground to air fire from enemy machine gun positions encircling Phu Nhon.

d. The 1st Battalion 45th Regiment moved to Buon Blech on 16 March and was to proceed north towards LZ Lonely and link up with the 3rd Cavalry Troop at AQ 855839. The 3rd Cavalry leading the advance was ambushed north of Lonely, but continued to advance north toward Phu Nhon after breaking contact. The 1-45 Regt, with the 3/3 Cavalry(-) attached, proceeded north to the vicinity of AQ 870965. The task force came under intense fire from a well fortified enemy force. When they attempted to by-pass the enemy on the eastern flank, the task force began taking heavy casualties. After regrouping, the element made no more assaults on 17 March while awaiting reinforcements. On 18 March the 1-45 Regt and the 3/3 Cavalry assaulted the position again from the east side of the road while the newly arrived 4-45 advanced on the west side of the road. 3/3 Cavalry received heavy casualties and heavy damage to many of its APCs in these assaults and was rendered ineffective and moved to the rear. The 1-92 FA forward observer with this task force, SFC Richard Parrish, did an outstanding job during these assaults. On the morning of 20 March an extensive artillery preparation was fired on the enemy position and after it was completed, the 1-45th, 4-45th and 2/3/3 Cavalry conducted an assault on the objective and overcame enemy resistance. The southern force moved north and the northern force continued south until they met at Phu Nhon District HQ where the enemy encirclement had been broken.

e. Throughout the siege the U. S. Artillerymen distinguished themselves by repeated acts of individual heroism. During the campaign the surrounded elements of C(2d plt)/1-92 FA and B/4-60 Arty, together with C(1st plt)/1-92 FA and B/7-14 FA at Weig. Davis and C(3d plt)/1-92 FA at LZ Lonely, expended over 1400 artillery rounds, thousands of 40mm Duster rounds and a large amount of small arms and automatic weapons ammunition inflicting hundreds of casualties among the attacking enemy forces while suffering minimum U. S. casualties. The enemy defense was characterized by heavy ground to air fire, B-40 rockets and small arms fire. Activity recorded during the week included 13 assaults by fire, 6 significant contacts, 5 road ambushes, and 6 incidents of ground to air fire. For their actions the artillerymen of 1st Battalion 92d Artillery received the following awards: 1 Silver Star, 1 Distinguished Flying Cross, 9 Bronze Stars with "V", 27 Army Commendation Medals with "V", 1 Air Medal with "V" and 1 Combat Medic Badge. C Battery is being submitted for an ARVN Unit Award for the period 16 to 20 March 1971 and for the U. S. Valorous Unit Citation.

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4. Communications:

- a. At the time of the attack, radios were distributed as follows:

2 ea GRC-46 - LNO 1-92 FA
1 ea GRC-46 - MACV Team
3 ea VRC-77 - MACV Team
1 ea GRC-46 - 2d plt, Btry C, 1-92 FA
1 ea PRC-25 - Btry B, 4-60 Arty

- b. The following equipment became inoperative during the campaign:

2 ea GRC-46 - LNO 1-92 FA
1 ea 30 KW Generator (destroyed) - MACV Team
2 ea 10 KW Generator (destroyed) - MACV Team
1 ea 1.5 DC Generator - LNO 1-92 FA

c. The U. S. personnel at FSB Miller were never without sufficient communications. Replacement equipment was sent out within 24 hours of the attack.

5. Logistics:

a. 94.3 tons of supplies were airlifted or trucked into C Battery's three locations at Weigt Davis, FSB Miller and LZ Lonely.

b. Convoys were used to take supplies to Weigt Davis and were unable to go further South.

c. All resupply to Phu Nhon was accomplished with UH1 helicopters, which made sorties from Weigt Davis.

d. CH-47 hook sorties were used to resupply Weigt Davis and LZ Lonely. Due to intense ground to air fire, Phu Nhon could not be resupplied by hooks.

6. Liaison/Forward-Observer-Teams:

- a. Liaison Teams:

(1) Initially one four-man LNO team (1-CPT, 3-EM) operated at Phu Nhon. It had been in position since 31 December 1970.

(2) As the mission requirements increased, one three-man LNO team was sent to the 47th ARVN Regiment and one three-man LNO team was sent to the 45th Regiment.

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b. Forward Observer Teams:

(1) Initially one FO team was deployed with the 45th Regiment, SP4 Richard Parrish. SP4 Parrish distinguished himself while serving with the 45th and with the 3rd Cavalry in the southern task force by controlling artillery fire, air strikes, gunships, medivacs and maintaining contact with the battalion all during the numerous assaults South of Phu Nhon. SP4 Parrish was with the lead elements during the conflict and did an outstanding job in keeping elements informed of the changing situation and his location while directing accurate and timely fire against the enemy. He was seriously wounded and had to be returned to the rear. For his valorous actions SP4 Richard Parrish received the Silver Star Medal.

(2) Air observers were on station during daylight hours throughout the conflict.

7. Ammunition:

a. During the campaign from 16 March to 21 March expenditures were reported by II Corps as follows:

	<u>U.S.</u>	<u>ARVN</u>	<u>SECTOR</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
105mm	--	6,617*	780*	7,397
155mm	1,280	1,052	--	2,332
175mm	99	--	--	99
8 inch	22	--	--	22
Totals	1,401	7,669	780	9,850

*These figures could not be verified by U. S. artillery personnel.

b. Ammunition resupply was accomplished by air using CH-47 and UH1D helicopters. The road South was cut off and convoys were unable to reach Phu Nhon. Service Battery convoyed to Weigt Davis and UH1D helicopters took resupply from there to Phu Nhon.

8. Losses:

a. The cumulative results for the period 16 March when the attack on Phu Nhon District commenced until 21 March when the relief operation was terminated are listed below.

b. Enemy Losses:

387 KIA (178 of these KBA)

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- 48 Small arms CIA
- 23 Crew-served weapons CIA
- 2 Radios (Chinese Communist Manufactured)
- 40 B-40 (RPG-2) Rounds CIA
- 12 82mm Mortar Rounds CIA

c. Friendly Losses:

	<u>1-92 FA</u>	<u>U.S.</u>	<u>AK47</u>	<u>RF/PF</u>
KIA	0	1	45	25
WIA	5	16	101	36
MIA	0	0	0	10

d. 1-92 FA losses included 1 ea 45 Cal pistol and 1 ea M-16 rifle which were lost in action by the LNO team.

1 Incl

1. Diagram of compound

John S. Chesbro
JOHN S. CHESBRO
LTC, FA
Commanding

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
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DIAGRAM OF PHU NHIEU DISTRICT HQ COMPOUND



LEGEND:

- S - 105mm ARVN
- L - 155mm U.S.
- D - Duster
- M - 60mm Mortar
- n - N-60 MG (VN N-60s and 50 Cal not included in diagram)
- A - Initial attack
- B - Second attack

Incl 1 to Incl 2

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